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Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions, ed.
John Haldane. University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. Pp. vii and 215.
$45.00 (regular price); $36.00 (discount price).
GORDON BARNES, University of St. Thomas
The editor of this new collection of essays hopes that it will foster "interactions and exchanges between analytical and scholastic, but especially
Aristotelian-Thomistic, philosophies" (p.x). This is a welcome change from
the usual tendency of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophers to limit themselves to the interpretation of classical texts. This collection of essays
abounds in arguments and theories that are well informed by both analytical and Aristotelian-Thomistic thought. As the title of the volume suggest~" the essays range over topics in the philosophy of mind, action theory, ontology, and theoretical ethics. In this review I will focus my attention
on four of these twelve essays.
Rkhard Cross's paper, "Aquinas and the Mind-Body Problem," is one
of the most lucid, balanced discussions of Aquinas's philosophy of mind to
date. After glossing the familiar surface of Aquinas's metaphysical
thought, Cross quickly descends into the deeper, more difficult questions
that many Aquinas commentators never ask. He begins with the familiar
theses of Aquinas's hylomorphism: that "all material substances are composites of prime matter and substantial form" (37); that "a substantial form,
for Aquinas, is ... that in virtue of which a body has the essential properties
which it has" (39); and, perhaps more controversially, that a substantial
form is "something like an instantiated property, or a property instance ... "
(39). Cross points out that this leaves open the possibility that substantial
forms, as individualized property-instances, are property-bearers in their
own right (40).
All of this sets the stage for Cross's discussion of Aquinas on the human
soul. Here again, he begins with the familiar. The human soul is the substantial form of a human body, which is to say that" a human soul is capable of satisfying, for a human body, all of those conditions which a substantial form satisfies" (40). Of course, Aquinas also maintains that the
human soul, unlike any other substantial form, is subsistent, which is to say
that it "exists in its own right" (40). This is because the human soul has
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activities-cognition and volition, which are not activities of the body.
Thus, for Aquinas,
... a human soul is more than just the substantial form of a human
body .... On this account, a human soul is an individual with certain
properties of its own .... [50] whereas 'being the substantial form of a
f-like body' is the only property had by material substantial forms
other than the human sout it is not the only property had by a
human soul. A human soul has two additional properties: capacities
for cognition and volition" (41).
From this point forward, Cross's account transcends the usual, tired renditions of Aquinas's view. Cross concludes that, for Aquinas, a whole
human being is actually more than just a composite of prime matter and
substantial form, since a whole human being also includes "that part of the
soul which, on Aquinas's showing, is not part of the body ... " (43).
Sometimes Cross states the overall view in mereological terms: one part of
the human soul is also a part of the form/matter composite that is the
human body, but another part of the human soul is not part of the
form/ matter composite that is the human body. Cross is always careful to
qualify his use of the term "part" with the phrase "in the relevant sense,"
but he often seems to find the language of mereology the most apt for
expressing Aquinas's view. Such metaphysical candor is a refreshing
change in Aquinas scholarship.
Cross thinks that this view is at least prima facie intelligible and coherent.
He says that liTo show incoherence, we would have to show that a human
soul could not instantiate the kinds of properties which Aquinas believes it
to instantiate. I do not see clearly how this could be done" (43). Cross considers two attempts to demonstrate incoherence, and finds them both
wanting. The first objection is that postulating this part of the soul that is
not a part of the form/matter composite is incompatible with sort of unity
that is required for genuine hylomorphic composition. Cross simply
replies that he finds this claim "debatable." The second objection is
Anthony Kenny's objection that Aquinas's conception of the human soul is
ambiguous as between that of an abstraction, and that of a concrete, particular agent. Cross replies that Aquinas does not think that an existing substantial form is an abstract item" (44).
I believe that Cross has succeeded thus far in defending his Aquinas
against the charge of incoherence. However, on closer examination of
Cross's Aquinas, I think that a hybrid of these two objections will reappear. Throughout his discussion, Cross moves back and forth between
the language of properties and the language of parts, sometimes even combining the two in a single statement. The following four statements illustrate what I mean.
II

" .. . [a substantial form is] something like an instantiated property, or a
property instance" (39)
"I think ... that [Aquinas] ought to agree [that a substantial form is a
set of characteristics]" (51, n12)
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liThe Thomist claim is that the human soul is a physical property
which is the subject of non-physical properties" (47).
" ... part of the human soul is a part of the body. . . .It therefore seems
to me that we should prefer the claim that a substcmtial form in some
sense includes, or is (partly) composed of, a body's properties ... "
(48).
In these and other statements, Cross tells us that the human soul is: (a) a
property-instance, (b) a physical property, (c) something that "includes"
some of the body's properties, and (d) a part of the body, which is "partly
composed of" a body's properties. Some of this variation can be explained
by the fact that Cross is sometimes explicating Aquinas, and sometimes
stating what he thinks Aquinas could and should say. But at the end of the
day, we have to wonder exactly what the fundamental ontology of Cross's
Aquinas is supposed to be.
I suspect that Cross is thinking something like the following. The
human soul is a particular property-instance, the parts of which are, themselves, also property-instances. An example will illustrate the idea.
Conslder a particular instance of the property being a water molecule. One
might hold that this property-instance has parts, which are, themselves,
property-instances. In this case the parts would be particular instances of
other properties, like being a hydrogen atom and being an oxygen atom, and
also particular instances of certain relations. In much the same way,
Cross's Aquinas might hold that the human soul is a certain propertyinstance, which is composed of other property-instances-it literally has
them as parts. Then Cross's Aquinas could say that some of the parts of
this composite property-instance are instances of physical properties,
whereas other parts of this composite property-instance are instances of
non-physical properties.
Some philosophers will worry that what we have here is simply a bundle theory, according to which a substantial form is merely an aggregate or
a collection of property-instances. Cross explicitly denies this. In a footnote, he says that "Someone accepting the claim that a substantial form is
a set I)f properties would not, of course, be thereby committed to the claim
that a substantial form is merely an aggregate of such properties" (51, n12).
This is not entirely clear. It depends on whether an entity, of whatever
kind, which is genuinely composite (has parts), is ipso facto identical with
the sum of its parts. Now, Aristotelian philosophers have long held that
the answer is "no." A genuinely composite object is not necessarily just the
sum of its parts. Of course, in defending this answer, Aristotelian philosophers usually appeal to the notion of a substantial form as that which unifies a substance, making it to be something more than merely the sum of its
parts. However, in this case, it is the very substantial form that is under
consideration. Is it possible to maintain that substantial forms themselves
are composites, with proper parts, yet also more than mere aggregates of
those parts? That is at least one of the questions on which this view ultimately depends.
In liThe Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind," John
Haldane argues that "the current situation within analytical philosophy [of
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mind] is untenable, and [therefore] space needs to be found for a range of
alternative approaches drawn from non-analytic sources, particularly historical ones" (59). Haldane's indictment comes in two parts. First, he
points out that many philosophers of mind, in an attempt to distance themselves from reductionism, have formulated their physicalism in terms of
global supervenience. These philosophers restrict their physicalism to the
meager thesis that there could not be a mental difference without some
physical difference, somewhere or other in the world. This weakening of the
physicalist thesis avoids some of the problems that attend more restrictive
varieties of physicalism, but only at the cost of rendering physicalism
much harder to motivate. As Haldane puts it,
"If .. .it is insisted that nothing more is presumed than global variation then the obvious question to press is why one should believe
that this is so; why in other words hold on to physicalism when it can
yield nothing in the way of understanding the existence or character
of the mental.. .. (61).

Now, some contemporaries would respond by defending a stronger variety of physicalism, whether token-physicalism, or even type-physicalism,
and they would thereby avoid Haldane's objection to mere global supervenience. This brings me to the second part of Haldane's indictment.
In sections IV and V of the paper, Haldane argues that the attempt to
accomodate perceptual content externalism within the context of a non-reductive physicalism is ultimately incoherent (63-67). However, this argument
trades on the assumption that non-reductive physicalism must be understood as the local supervenience of perceptual content on physical states of
the brain. Now, if that were the only possibility for the non-reductive
physicalist, then obviously non-reductive physicalism would be incompatible with any sort of content-externalism. However, it is for just this reason
that the non-reductive phYSicalist is sure to broaden the supervenience
base of perceptual content to include features of the subject's environment
that are relevant to fixing the content of her perceptual states, thereby
including the causal relations between the environment and the neurophysiological states of the subject in the supervenience base of perceptual
content. Then the final picture would look something like this. (Let P represent a physical state of the environment, c the appropriate causal relation, P* the neurophysiological effect in the subject, and R the perceptual,
representational state.)
R

t

t

P'---,-c'---'

t
P*

According to this view, a certain physical state of the environment is the
efficient cause of a neurophysiological state of the subject, and both this
state of the environment and its causal relation to the subject are part of the
whole supervenience base of the perceptual, representational state of the
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subject. There is no obvious logical inconsistency here. There would be an
inconsistency only if we forced the non-reductive physicalist to hold that
perceptual, representational content supervenes on nothing more than the
neural state of the subject, but why should the non-reductive physicalist
have to hold that? The supervenience base for the perceptual, representational content includes not only the neurophysiological state of the subject,
but also the fact that this state was caused in the appropriate way by the
state of the environment that caused it. I do not see any contradiction in
this overall view.
Nevertheless, Haldane is clearly right about this much: if the nonreductive physicalist is to accommodate content externalism, then she
must expand the supervenience base of perceptual states to include the
environment of the subject. This is certainly a step away from the tidiness
of local supervenience, and towards a mere global supervenience, in which
case Haldane's complaints about the motivations for holding to mere global supervenience are still to the point. Perhaps this alone is enough to vindicate his call to re-open the books on historical alternatives to the current
paradigm.
In "The Active and Potential Intellects: Aquinas as a Philosopher in His
Own Right," David Braine expounds Aquinas's account of the intellect, contrasting it with both Platonist and empiricist alternatives. According to
Braine, Aquinas identifies our capacity to use general concepts with the
intellect's possession of the relevant "intellectual species" (22). These intellectual species make possible "all applications of general concepts expressible in linguistic form" (25). They also make possible "judgments of what
arises simply from the meaning of the general term or predicate concerned,
or from what belongs to the general nature of the kind of thing being considered, ... , such as go beyond anything straightforwardly perceptual" (26).
In short, the intellectual species make possible the possession and use of
general concepts, and also all judgments that outrun mere sense perception.
In contrast with Platonism, Braine insists that, for Aquinas,

.. .~;pecies are never actual or real objects. Their existence in the intellect consists in the intellect's thereby having the means of understanding real things of a certain kind, e.g. in the case of the intellectual species of a cow the means of understanding the nature of cows as
cows (24).
At this point one begins to wonder if Aquinas's intellectual species are
doing any real theoretical work here. Intellectual species were introduced
to explain the intellect's capacity for the application of general concepts,
and its capacity for knowledge that transcends sense-perception. The idea
seemed to be that if we accept a bit of ontology-the existence of intellectual species, then we can explain our capacity to apply general concepts, and
make universal judgments that transcend sense-perception. However,
then Braine tells us that the existence of intellectual species really amounts
to nothing more than this very capacity to understand things of a certain
kind as things of that kind. So, in the end, it looks as if the intellectual
species are defined in terms of the very capacity that they were introduced
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to explain, in which case they do not provide an explanation of general
concept application at all, but only a place-holder for such an explanation.
In his elaboration of Aquinas's theory, Braine turns to Aquinas's
account of sense-perception, and especially vision. Braine asks us to consider a case in which someone is looking at the roof of a house through a
clean, colorless window pane.
The light which comes to us by reflection off the roof that we see is
configured in a certain way, both in each stage of its passing through
the air, in the window pane, in the air between us and the window
pane, and in the pupil. Plainly, our perception of the roof depends
on this configuration at each stage having some sort of isomorphism
('sameness of form') with the roof relevant to this perception. (30)
Here we get more information about the nature of intelligible species,
through an analogy with Aquinas's theory of sense perception, and the
corresponding sensible species. What Braine suggests is that an intelligible
species is a configuration that is somehow isomorphic with that which it repreSetzts. This is at least the beginning of a genuine theory, but it is only the
very beginning. There are many questions left unanswered. Hopefully
Thomistic theorists will continue to develop this line of thought in more
detail. Only then will it be possible to assess it fully.
In UHylomorphism and Individuation," David Oderberg examines the
scholastic doctrine that designated matter is the principle of individuation of
complete material substances. After canvassing the most salient scholastic
alternatives to this view, Oderberg carefully works out the details of the
view. Designated matter is matter possessing indeterminate quantity
(130). Indeterminate quantity is understood as "whatever range of definite
quantities, prescribed by the form itself, a substance happens to have"
(135). Oderberg's idea is that what individuates a material substance is not
its determinate quantity at one particular time, but rather all the quantities
and spatial locations of its matter at all the times at which it exists. No
other individual has exactly the same determinate quantities, in exactly the
same places, at exactly the same times. Thus, Oderberg says that "Socrates
and Callias might share their matter, and they might even do so in the
same place; but it will not be at the same time" (134).
One obvious worry here is that this principle of individuation will make
the individuality of material substances logically contingent. Although
Socrates and Calli as do not share the same quantities of matter at the very
same places and the very same times, surely the material quantities, locations, and times that are unique to them could have been reversed. It is logically possible, one might suggest, that Socrates' matter have had the very
dimensional quantities, at the very same spatial locations, and at the very
same times, as Callias actually has, and vice versa. In that case, Oderberg's
principle of individuation implies that the very individualities of Socrates
and Callias would have been reversed, but surely that is impossible.
Oderberg seems to be aware of this objection. In response, he contends
that the principle of individuality and the principle of identity need not be
the same (136). What he is suggesting, as far as I can tell, is that what indi-
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viduates a material substance need not be that which determines its identity over time and possibilities as well. What Oderberg is offering us is
merely a principle of individuation, not a principle of identity. It is not
entirely clear to me that this separation of the principle of individuality
from the principle of identity is coherent.
Here is a simple argument. To say that something is an individual is to
say that it is exactly one thing. It is to say that it has unity or oneness. Thus,
the question "Is this an individual?" is fundamentally the question "How
many things are there here? One or many?" Consequently, the question
"What makes this thing to be an individual?" is logically equivalent to the
question "What makes it the case that there is exactly one thing here?"
Thus, the principle of individuation is supposed to answer this question of
"how many?" Now, if the principle of individuation answers this question
of one or many, at a certain place, at a certain time, then one might expect
the same principle to answer the same question of one or many over time
and across possibilities. If so, then the principle of individuation for a material substance should also serve as a principle of identity for that substance
across time and possibilities. For this reason, I am not certain that matter
possE'ssing indeterminate quantity could serve as the principle of individuation, since it fails as a principle of identity across time and possibilities.

The Divine Attributes, by Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 2002. Pp. 204. $62.95. $26.95 (paper).
PAUL K. MOSER, Loyola University of Chicago
This book, complete with a glossary of technical terms, offers a remarkably
lucid exposition of the idea of God as a maximally great being. At times the
authors shift from talk of idea to talk of nature. They thus identify their
main purpose as giving "a rational account of the nature of God, that is, of
the God of the three major Western religions of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam" (p. 3). Caution is in order here, given a common use of "the nature
of X" in ordinary language. If God must exist in order for there to be "the
nature of God," the authors' stated purpose must be reformulated. The
authors, however, do not use "the nature of God" in a way that has existential import regarding God. Their talk of "defining the nature of God" is
synonymous with their talk of "defining the idea, or the concept, of God"
(cf. p. 4). The authors thus do not begin with the assumption that God
exists. On the contrary, the book concludes with some doubts about rational belief that God exists.
What do the authors mean by "a rational account of the nature of God"?
They do not mean "an account indicating that commitment to the reality of
God's nature is epistemically rational." They focus instead on an account
indicating that the concept of God as a maximally great being is "coherent"
(p. 6) Given that "rational" is ordinarily used to connote an epistemic status exceeding logical and conceptual coherence, it may have been more
straightforward for the authors to talk instead of a logically and conceptually
coherent account of the concept of God. They mainly seek consistency in the

